

## Social Equality Conference, Philosophy Department, UCT, 15-17 August 2014

### Papers ordered alphabetically by presenter

<b>(1) Cathi Albertyn</b>	<b><i>Addressing Gender Inequality in Law: The Place of Socio-Economic Disadvantage</i></b>
Professor of Law University of the Witwatersrand	The need to address systemic and gendered disadvantage has been a core theme in much feminist legal scholarship on equality. In South Africa, the emphasis on disadvantage has both political and legal origins. In political terms, remedying socio-economic disadvantage and thus achieving substantive equality (the two were linked) was the central call of the broad women's movement in the early 1990s, which recognised that formal equality was only a first step in a longer process of transformation of society. In legal terms, consciousness of local gender politics, international trends and the influence of Canadian and other feminists underpinned scholarship that prioritised 'disadvantage'. This paper will briefly traverse this approach, as well as the manner in which it has been included, but often not applied, in equality jurisprudence. The main (and new) point of the paper, however, will be to critically examine the use of 'disadvantage' in later cases (as yet unexamined) by both judges and lawyers advocating for gender equality. The paper will explore the idea that 'disadvantage' (always a contested idea) has acquired a narrow meaning that limits the ability of 'equality law' to secure 'transformative' or 'substantive' ends.
<b>(2) Lucy Allais</b>	<b><i>Equality of Freedom</i></b>
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy University of Sussex  Associate Professor of Philosophy University of the Witwatersrand	I have argued that Kant's political philosophy provides a compelling explanation of the deeply troubling nature of encounters with beggars: the interaction implicates you in relations of servility and humiliation from which you do not escape by giving or by not giving. Kant's account is centrally concerned with the defence of property, and his fundamental justificatory and explanatory concept is freedom, so it might be thought that equality is not a central value in his account. Nevertheless, I argue that his account gives a compelling analysis of what is troubling about particular kinds of inequalities: those exemplified by the existence of beggars. Kant is concerned that basic needs should be met through justice, not charity; he thinks it does not just matter that people get their needs met, but how they are met. In basing the account on freedom, the argument has bite against those who take liberty rather than welfare as the fundamental value. Further, the argument shows that starting with equality at the level of freedom, basic rights and dignity has powerful implications for understanding welfare distribution in a legitimate state, and the implications this has for how citizens can relate rightfully to each other as individuals.
<b>(3) Tom Angier</b>	<b><i>What Can Plato Teach Us About Equality?</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy University of Cape Town	Ancient Athens was a pioneering attempt to build an egalitarian democracy. Indeed, terms with the prefix <i>iso-</i> ('equal') abound in the Ancient Greek vocabulary. It seems disappointing, then, that the greatest philosophers of the time – Plato and Aristotle – appear anything but egalitarian democrats. Plato, in particular, is widely believed to have bequeathed us (in his <i>Republic</i> ) one of the most concerted critiques of political equality in the Western canon. With certain qualifications, I shall hold, this is simply undeniable. Nonetheless, I will also argue that, if we look carefully – especially at Book VIII of the <i>Republic</i> – there are three crucial lessons to be learnt from Plato's critique. (1) Contemporary egalitarian 'democracies' are in key respects closer to oligarchies; (2) Policies justified under the banner of equality, or equal rights, are often grounded merely in impertunate desires, desires which do not clearly promote the common good; (3) Plato's notion that democracy inevitably evolves into tyranny, although empirically false, highlights (a) how people can prefer a strongly non-egalitarian constitution, given certain dividends for themselves; (b) that given serious enough moral/cultural/ethnic divisions within a State, egalitarian democracy may simply be incapable of maintaining stability and order.

<b>(4) Sean Archer</b>	<b><i>Can Social and Economic Rights in the South African Constitution Decrease Social Inequality?</i></b>
Professor of Economics University of Cape Town	The South African Bill of Rights is widely admired, partly so as an instrument for greater equality. This paper arises from research work that applies an economic perspective to the implementation problems when such rights are subjected to judicial enforcement. Section 27 states “Everyone has the right to have access to (a) health care services, (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.” These are examples of <i>claim-rights</i> . The philosophical status of human rights rests upon a set of moral goals. <i>Interpretation</i> is the first problem when we move from abstract formulation to operational definition. How must the supply of health, social security, food and water be <i>translated</i> into concrete policy goals that meet the underlying moral objective? Most economic thinking is utilitarian and consequentialist. An individual’s choice and action is assessed by identifying and evaluating its consequences, <i>not</i> by judging whether it is a moral claim or has moral weight as essential to individual self-realization. The conflict in perspective is clear.
<b>(5) Oduora Okpoka Asuo</b>	<b><i>Animal Rights and Social Equality: Any Possibility of a Connection?</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy University of Calabar	It is often the case that people investigate the issues generated by and surrounding the problem of social inequality without attempting to trace the roots of social inequality or they limit its cause(s) to human societies and man’s relationship to fellow men. This error has left the problem largely the same and has therefore provided the grounds for this research which views inequality in human societies as traceable to poor relationship between man and non-human animals. This paper makes the point that the level of rights accorded non-human animals in a particular society is directly proportional to the state of equality among men in that society. The problem of inequality in human societies can therefore be solved or improved by deliberately attempting to draw the attention of humans to the deprivation of the rights of non-human animals in these societies.
<b>(6) Karim Barakat</b>	<b><i>Hegel and Rancière on Equality</i></b>
PhD candidate in Philosophy Duquesne University	In his <i>Philosophy of Right</i> , Hegel argues that equality should not play any role in the development of a science of right. By relegating the status of equality to negative freedom which is suspended as soon as the constitution of a positive right begins, Hegel attempts to build a political edifice that relies on freedom and rejects what he takes to be the impeding effect of equality. Accordingly, equality is revealed as an abstract value that merely leads to the destruction of institutions, as exemplified in the French Revolution. Yet, Hegel’s views on equality have been challenged by the continuous appeal to Marxism in the twentieth century. Among those, Jacques Rancière’s work appears to be most vocal in advocating the role of equality in politics. For Rancière, politics altogether is not possible without the presupposition of equality. In its absence, we are left with a totalitarian “police” state that is exclusionary. The purpose of this paper is thus twofold. First, I attempt to provide a consistent reading of Hegel’s political philosophy as rejecting equality. Second, I argue that Rancière’s account offers a challenge to Hegel’s view as he shows that equality is a presupposition that remains active throughout politics.

<b>(7) David Bilchitz</b>	<b><i>Equality, Liberty and Modern Constitutionalism</i></b>
<p>Professor of Law University of Johannesburg</p> <p>Director South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law</p>	<p>The modern constitutions of the last thirty years embrace both the set of concerns traditionally associated in political philosophy with the advocates of 'liberty' as well as those embraced by advocates of distributive 'equality'. In this paper, I shall seek to conceptualise the broad structure that an approach to distributive justice should adopt if it wishes to give effect to the dual imperatives of liberty and equality. In the first part of the paper, I propose to distinguish between one-tier, no-tier and two-tier theories of distributive justice. I shall contend that a two-tier structure offers the best possibility of reconciling liberty and equality. At the level of structure, however, difficulties arise in arriving at some level of determinacy around the level of equality to be guaranteed in the first tier as well as ensuring that both tiers remain distinct and separate. The second part of the paper considers the conception of each of these two tiers in two famous egalitarian liberal theories, that of Ronald Dworkin and that of John Rawls. I investigate the manner in which the problems relating to that structure affect their respective theories and the resources they have to address these problems. The final section of</p>
<b>(8) Vivienne Bozalek</b>	<b><i>Social Justice and the Political Ethic of Care – A Normative Framework for Equality</i></b>
<p>Director: Teaching and Learning University of the Western Cape</p>	<p>This presentation will focus on the importance of considering both care and social justice with regard to equality, rather than foregrounding one or the other approach. The <i>political</i> ethics of care and social justice perspectives will be used to develop a normative framework which could be used to make judgements about the extent to which equality can be achieved. Ideas from theorists who have written about equality such as Nancy Fraser, Martha Nussbaum, Iris Marion Young and political care ethicists such as Joan Tronto, Selma Sevenhuijsen and Fiona Robinson will be referred to in developing this normative framework from which to judge equality. Nussbaum's capabilities and Fraser's notions of social justice involving recognition, redistribution and representation for achieving participatory parity or the ability to interact as equals will be discussed in relation to equality. In addition to these considerations, however, the centrality of care needs to be acknowledged to live in the world as well as possible. How responsibilities for care are apportioned in society and who gets to receive 'passes' from these responsibilities would be important considerations. For equality to occur, no one can be regarded as being exempted from these responsibilities. Young's notion of connected responsibility is also considered.</p>
<b>(9) Jeremy Cronin</b>	<b><i>The Bigger the Cake? Growth, Jobs and Equality</i></b>
<p>Deputy Minister: Public Works South Africa</p> <p>Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist Party</p>	<p>In South Africa there are persisting patterns of extreme inequality. It is generally agreed that our current levels of inequality (however defined) are unsustainable, constituting a threat to the important democratic gains achieved since the end of apartheid. But how to overcome inequality? The dominant assumption in the mainstream public debate, including in many official government policy documents (notably the National Development Plan), is that there needs to be sustained economic "growth", surpassing 5 percent annually. A "win-win" "growing of the cake", it is assumed, will create "jobs", and with more people in formal employment stark inequalities will be moderated. The paper will critique the assumptions underlying this seemingly self-evident perspective by engaging critically with the three core concepts "growth", "jobs" and "equality". In particular, the GDP fetish, the question of what is a job (and therefore what defines employment and unemployment), and the two predominant versions of equality in the South African debate – "equal rights" and an "equal opportunity society" - will be considered critically.</p>

<b>(10) Ann E. Cudd</b>	<b><i>What is the Point of (Equality in) Higher Education?</i></b>
University Distinguished Professor Vice-Provost Dean of Undergraduate Studies University of Kansas	Should higher education aim to train elite innovators and leaders in order to maximize economic, scientific, and technological growth in society or should it aim to educate all citizens for democratic engagement? An argument could be made for either approach. The elite approach leads to greater wealth that can be redistributed, at least in part, to raise the level of well-being of all. The democratic approach creates engaged citizens who can together solve problems and innovate to bring about an equal level of well-being that may still be fairly high. I shall argue that evidence from the US shows that both aims cannot be simultaneously achieved in an environment where every institution can choose its strategy independently of others. Given that, a society must choose a higher education strategy on the basis of what its citizens hold to be the point of higher education. I claim that higher education should disrupt patterns of wealth inequality. This suggests that the state should mandate the elite approach for low income and first generation students at elite institutions, and the democratic approach, offering only need-based aid to all students meeting a threshold qualifications for academic ability and financial need, at non-elite institutions.
<b>(11) Raff Donelson</b>	<b><i>Rational Hate</i></b>
PhD candidate in Philosophy Northwestern University	Almost everyone recognizes that homophobia conflicts with achieving social equality, but little attention has been paid to thinking about what homophobia is and how to criticize it. One way of understanding homophobia is as an irrational, prejudiced attitude against homosexuality or (perceived) homosexual people. This understanding leads naturally to the following criticism of homophobia: it cannot be tolerated like other opinions that people have, even other destructive opinions like that torture is permissible in interrogation, because homophobia is formally irrational. That is, homophobia flouts a basic, formal norm of rationality because, as a variety of prejudice or prejudging, this attitude arises prior to anything like a rationale. Jean-Paul Sartre suggests an account and critique of all forms of prejudice on such grounds, and such thinking is explicitly developed for considering homophobia by Christine Pierce. Against this, I deny that all homophobes fail a test of formal rationality; to illustrate this, I draw on the writings of some evangelical Christian activists which seem to espouse a rational form of homophobia. Furthermore, I argue that grounding opposition to homophobia in a claim about the form of thought it instances is misguided, even if that 'form of thought' claim were true.
<b>(12) Mesembe Ita Edet</b>	<b><i>Re-Strategizing Social Equality within the Context of the Complementary System of Thought in African Philosophy</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy University of Calabar	The paper applies the principle of complementarity, as this is a dominant idea in African philosophy to re-evaluate the issue of social equality. It discusses the effect which the challenges of the ambivalent nature of all human existential situations can have in the use of equality as a category of interaction. Most central to this challenge are some false assumptions that have entered into the way we view the world in everyday life. The paper seeks to expose the cause of these false assumptions. The argument advanced is that we must accept inequality as a fundamental aspect of the infrastructure of life. The paper shows how the principle of complementarity can be used as a higher principle to achieve social justice based on the notions—not of equality, but of mutual respect, recognition, belongingness, interrelatedness, integration, harmony and truth.

<b>(13) Bart Engelen</b>	<b><i>Biting the Bullet: Why Leveling Down Can Benefit Everybody</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy Katholieke Universiteit Leuven	While those who consider equality intrinsically valuable are led to promote levelling down, those who consider it instrumentally valuable rightly ask what good can possibly come from reducing inequalities by making everyone worse off (Parfit 1997). In my view, the answer lies in the notion of 'positional goods'. If the value of a good depends heavily not on its absolute but on its relative amount, inequalities can never be to everyone's advantage. Whenever others have more, my decreased relative amount implies that this inequality makes me worse off. This holds not only for zero-sum games (e.g. number of votes in an election), but also for other 'social primary goods' and 'bases of self-respect' (e.g. income). Rawls' (instrumental) argument that " <i>injustice then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all</i> " (1971: 62) should make us more suspicious of 'social and economic inequalities' than Rawls himself. The desire to have more (positional goods) than others generates a treadmill the outcomes of which no longer benefit anyone. I combine both philosophical analyses of (in)equality and empirical data about its effects on people's lives (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010) to argue that levelling down may not be as absurd as it seems.
<b>(14) Teppo Eskelinen</b>	<b><i>Equality, Risks and Certainty</i></b>
Lecturer in Political Economy University of Eastern Finland	Equality is typically discussed in terms of access to resources, with some differences between schools of thought. Yet what is often missing in the literature on equal distribution is the <i>temporal</i> aspect of justice. Yet in contemporary theories of social stratification, "ontological security" is seen as a key issue. Simply put, access to social goods here and now does not suffice as a criterion of social justice. Also the prospects of continuity of this access need to be addressed. The increased importance of this aspect is emphasised by the rise of "financial capitalism", along with increasing "precarity" in both labour and social services. In my paper, I will discuss how certainty of the future and avoidance of risks should figure in theory of equality. The key questions addressed are: Why is certainty of the future (protection from risks) important for egalitarian ideals? To what extent <i>can</i> certainty be distributed equally? To what extent it <i>should</i> be distributed equally? How should the formal mechanisms of risk distribution (financial markets, insurance) be assessed normatively from this perspective?
<b>(15) Edwin Etieyibo</b>	<b><i>Minorities and Cultural Diversity: Isn't Multiculturalism Also Bad For Men?</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy University of the Witwatersrand	In a 1999 paper, which was later expanded into an anthology, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" Susan Moller Okin argues that an entrenched concern for cultural diversity and group rights may undermine women's rights. Some response to her worry is that this problem could be avoided if in pursuit of cultural diversity and group rights we simply require that protected groups internally organize themselves along liberal lines. Okin is not satisfied with this move, since according to her the treatment of women in the private sphere may slip through the respect of basic civil and political liberties of women and girls that such policy provides. In this paper I am interested in defending two claims. Firstly, the claim that if Okin is right about what goes on in the private sphere, then multiculturalism may also be bad for men given that what takes place in the private sphere may shape men to be particular type of humans — the type of humans that they may not have desired to be. Secondly, if we think that cultural nihilism and universalism are undesirable, then the "subtle shaping" of men and women that goes on in the private sphere should be accommodated in society.

<b>(16) Miranda Fricker</b>	<b><i>Epistemic Equality?</i></b>
Professor of Philosophy University of Sheffield	<p>The question of social equality can be framed in terms of how far different social groups are able to participate in socially valuable practices of various kinds—educational, economic, political, religious—so that if a group is revealed as prevented from engaging sufficiently in any of these, this counts as a kind of unfair inequality. I will explore the idea of <i>epistemic participation</i> in this light. In particular, I will try out the idea that <i>knowledge exchange</i> and <i>comprehension of one's own social experiences</i> are two fundamentally important aspects of epistemic participation. When either of these is thwarted, one or other kind of epistemic injustice threatens (testimonial or hermeneutical).</p> <p>Having set the issue up in this way, I will try to show how highlighting this epistemic dimension of inequality helps us understand better how <i>epistemic justice</i> is an implicit condition of: (i) the classical liberal case for freedom of speech (Mill); and (ii) the republican conception of freedom as non-domination (Pettit). These two points together suggest a case for regarding epistemic participation as something that should feature in the list of basic human capabilities.</p>
<b>(17) Machteld Geuskens</b>	<b><i>Epistemic Justice as Grounding Affirmative Action</i></b>
PhD candidate in Philosophy University of Tilburg	<p>A defense of Affirmative Action (AA) on the basis of fair social representation has two defects: (1) AA can be regarded as a form of discrimination itself; (2) AA stigmatizes those who belong to the underrepresented group as less capable since its members are considered 'unable to achieve the same positions without AA, exceptional cases aside'. Underlying these defects is a resistance to the idea that justice would demand that desired social outcomes trump epistemic merit such that criteria of merit do not pertain equally to all. To defend AA in a way which is more true to its aim of achieving just outcomes and to show when and why AA is just, I suggest AA is best understood and presented as a matter of epistemic justice, namely as correcting for epistemic injustices such as prejudice and stereotype threat. This defense requires a distinction between epistemic justice and social justice, and that we show why AA relates to epistemic justice, rather than the division of social power. I argue that as epistemic justice concerns the proper use and allocation of 'epistemic power', it can justify AA without defects (1) and (2) because AA targets epistemic injustices.</p>
<b>(18) Daryl Glaser</b>	<b><i>Race Redress: Radical-Egalitarian Considerations</i></b>
Associate Professor of Politics Head: Department of Political Studies University of the Witwatersrand	<p>My paper explores whether demands for racial redress in South Africa can be subsumed or superseded by a forward-looking inter-individual equalisation of material living standards, power and social bases of self esteem. A supercessionist programme of this kind could deal pretty well with collective black demands for compensation of historically-caused inequality and powerlessness. More questionable is whether material and power equalisation could address (i) collective black needs for restoration of esteem, dignity and recognition in light of past wrongs and (ii) individual black demands for compensation for gross violations of dignity personally suffered. To be sure, material and power equalisation would go <i>some way</i> to meeting (i) and even (ii). But it would be unlikely to compensate blacks in a full, account-settling way for past trauma or for continuing psychic hurt arising from past injuries. Can the third equalisation - of the social bases of esteem, dignity and recognition - soak up remaining unmet redress requirements? A forward-looking version might not. I thus anticipate that South Africa will continue to require some, probably incoherent, combination of redress and equalisation. This is disappointing, but would leave forward-looking egalitarians with points to make against gratuitous and inegalitarian redress.</p>

<b>(19) Amanda Gouws</b>	<b><i>Dealing with Tensions between Universal Human Rights and Culture in Multi-Cultural Societies: The Case of South Africa's Traditional Courts Bill</i></b>
Professor of Political Science University of Stellenbosch	In South Africa nearly 18 million people live under customary law for which certain cultural and traditional practices are important. Many of these practices are, however, undermining the human rights of women and are harmful to women. Very often a Western response would be that these practices are "backward" and "uncivilized" and should be eradicated. This paper will attempt to demonstrate through an analysis of recent legislation that has passed through parliament or is still under consideration in the provinces in South Africa (the Communal Land Rights Act and the Traditional Courts Bill) that strengthens the power of traditional leaders to show its discriminatory nature, but also to argue that there are ways in which we can still protect culture and tradition in ways that do not discriminate against women. Gender relations in post-colonial, multi-cultural societies are complex and the solutions to problems that are viewed as undermining universal human rights should be treated both from a perspective of acknowledging the identities of groups involved but also by looking at intra-group equality. Very often there will be intergroup equality between groups but within groups men and women can be treated quite differently, leading to discrimination against women. The question this paper will grapple with is how to deal with intragroup inequality in the liberal democracy of South Africa.
<b>(20) George Hull</b>	<b><i>The impossibility of a liberal egalitarian conception of welfare</i></b>
Lecturer in Philosophy University of Cape Town	A theory of distributive justice is meant to enable us to assess how just the allocation of goods and resources in a society is. In order to do this, it will generally need to be equipped with a conception of welfare fine-grained enough to determine how well-off, relative to one another, individual society-members are, and how much better- or worse-off individual society-members are made by interventions on the part of the state. Liberal egalitarian theories of justice (e.g. those of Rawls, Sen and Nussbaum) aim to provide a more or less egalitarian account of a just allocation of goods and resources in a society, which is, moreover, equally acceptable to all (reasonable) conceptions of the human good. I argue that the aims of liberal egalitarian theories of justice entail three conditions which a liberal egalitarian conception of welfare must meet. These three conditions have, I argue, determined the course of the liberal debate on welfare which has taken place over the last half-century; but, because the three conditions are incompatible with one another, we cannot expect that an acceptable liberal egalitarian conception of welfare will be forthcoming. In conclusion I outline this result's implications for liberal egalitarian theories of justice.
<b>(21) Motlatsi Khosi</b>	<b><i>Ubuntu as a Philosophy from Below</i></b>
Masters candidate Political Philosophy and Social Theory University of Cape Town	What does it mean to engage in a philosophy of struggle and emancipation within our current South African context? Within the struggles of the Abahlali BaseMjondolo a shack dweller's movement located in and around Durban, and various human settlements within KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape, the ways in which they organise their struggle and articulate their struggle for service delivery, from this context I argue, a philosophy is at work. This philosophy is one which is based on the lived experiences understanding of their struggle of having to break away from being targeted and identified as 'the poor' by media, state institutions and academics. Through M.B Ramose's explanation of what it means to treat "Ubuntu as a philosophy" the struggles of Abahlali will be shown to be the activities of a philosophy at work and examine the possibilities of what it means to be actively engaging in an African philosophy from below.

<b>(22) Hyunseop Kim</b>	<b><i>The Division of Moral Labor for Family</i></b>
Assistant Professor in Philosophy Seoul National University	I argue that the background institutions of socioeconomic justice help individuals realize the value of intimacy in family. For example, baby talk, bedtime story-reading, and dinner conversations help middle-class children build larger vocabularies than peers in working-class families, widen the academic achievement gap across social classes, and can undermine equality of opportunity. Only when public education makes up for the word gap from family communication and levels the academic playing field can middle-class parents express parental love as they see fit in good faith. I also argue that the job of preventing intrafamilial inequality should be outsourced to social institutions (e.g., family law), rather than left to individuals. I illustrate the claim that institutions that secure intrafamilial justice facilitate spontaneous affection and benevolence in families by criticizing Okin's proposal that employers should send equally divided paychecks separately to husband and wife. This division of moral labor for family provides a new rationale for governmental intervention in family, helps make sense of Rawls's position on family as part of the basic structure, and supports Scheffler's interpretation of the division of moral labor as a strategy for jointly realizing diverse values that would otherwise conflict with one another.
<b>(23) Helen Lauer</b>	<b><i>The Anatomy of Collusion</i></b>
Professor of Philosophy University of Ghana	Many ethicists discuss social inequality as if prejudice (racial, sexual, religious) were the expression of individuals' moral <i>akrasia</i> or "cognitive incapacity" (Appiah 1991), as if reform depended upon convincing bigots through facts and sound arguments. But this approach to social transformation is futile, if it persists as the consequence of a misleading tendency to treat rational agents as reasoning and acting intentionally in isolation from their social identities and circumstances. It is not obvious that individuals are acting irrationally when coping effectively in a systemically bigoted and duplicitous social environment. "Membership norms" (Cancian 1975) and conventions can function in agents' intentions without the agents holding beliefs that their conforming behaviour is ethical or even significant. By distinguishing between the contribution of propositional beliefs and other propositional attitudes <i>versus</i> the acceptance of policies in practical reasoning (Cohen 1992), and by recognising the way normality pre-empts the propriety of formulating one's own reason for one's behaviour (Castañeda 1975, MacIntyre 1986) we can appreciate why it is crucial to work at the levels of governmental agency, legislation and institutional arrangements to address injustices based on group discrimination.
<b>(24) Tendayi Marovah</b>	<b><i>Citizenship education and human capabilities: A strategy for addressing social inequalities</i></b>
PhD candidate in Higher Education and Development University of the Free State	This conceptual paper contributes towards the expansion of literature on the role that citizenship education may play in advancing social equality and hence social justice in the context of an unequal society. Even though debates on social equality and inequality are well documented, many of the debates seem to dwell on distributive justice centring on access and distribution of power and resources across various categories like gender and race. Focusing more on relational justice, the paper argues that in a democratic South Africa, citizenship education advancing the formation of critical democratic citizens is essential in shifting towards a more egalitarian society. Drawing on the rich notion of the capabilities approach (CA) and the philosophy of Ubuntu, the paper demonstrates how human capabilities backed by Ubuntu values can inspire such a change. Human capabilities in this case are human choices, freedoms and opportunities to do and to be what they value as a way of achieving well-being (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011).Foregrounding the CA in citizenship education provides a strategic way of dealing with social inequalities that are subtly embedded in institutional arrangements beyond issues of access and distributive justice which Marion Young (1990) calls the five faces of oppression.





<b>(28) Alfred Moraka</b>	<b><i>The Question of Equality: Critical Readings and Critique</i></b>
Assistant Lecturer in Jurisprudence University of Pretoria	In this paper I will be considering the different dominant formulations of the concept of equality within post-apartheid South African politics. I will subject these formulations of equality to a critical left understanding of justice and egalitarianism and in so doing I will expose how these dominant conceptions of equality not only deprive us of the possibility of a just and egalitarian society but that in a frightening and politically perverse turn they also guarantee both the maintenance and the reproduction of the very conditions, hierarchies and social formations from which they claim to be seeking equality. I will illustrate my latter and former claim by unpacking the paradoxes and contradiction inherent in the equality arguments and logics deployed in the struggle for the recognition of same-sex marriage globally and locally. My claims above will further be illustrated by a critique of the political rhetoric used to frame and legally justify the introduction and the need for affirmative action measures to address a racially unequal South African economic condition. In the last part of my paper I will appeal (and caution) against a prevailing interpretation of equality which conflates equality into what I understand to be politics of sameness, assimilation, replication.
<b>(29) Karin Murriss</b>	<b><i>The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child's Voice</i></b>
Associate Professor of Education University of Cape Town	Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child (as educator) and adult (as learner). Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers' prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls 'epistemic injustice' which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to (black) child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves 'cracking' the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education.
<b>(30) Gabriel Bubu Ncha</b>	<b><i>The Group vs. the Individual: An Inquiry into the Concept of Equality as a Political Goal</i></b>
<b>&amp; Jonathan Okeke Chimakonam</b>  Lecturers in Philosophy University of Calabar	Equality could refer to opportunity to express individuals' abilities or to the right to vie, contest, compete or take advantage of certain opportunities or even to the freedom to pursue or obtain certain opportunities in the society. In this paper we shall argue (a) that not all forms of equality should constitute political goal (b) that group-based equality e.g. racial, ethnic, tribal, religious, cultural, economic and other socio-political groups constitute political goal (c) that certain individual-based equality like human rights also constitutes political goal, but (d) that certain individual-based equality like economic, social, religious and political should not constitute political goal. One cannot demand for example, that everyone in his society earns the same income or occupies the same political position. This paper therefore, argues for a, b and c above with the Nigerian society as a case in point but maintains that item d above constitutes the ultimate diversity or necessary individual-based inequality required for a society to function as one.

<b>(31) Pierre-Yves Néron</b>	<b><i>Hierarchies, Managerial Authority and Organizational Relations: Arguing for Economic Democracy</i></b>
Assistant Professor of Economic and Social Ethics Institut de Philosophie Université Catholique de Lille	My aim in this paper is to contribute to the debate between “distributive” and “relational” forms of egalitarianism by advancing two broad claims. First, I argue that in order to better grasp the nature of different forms of inequalities, relational egalitarians should think more seriously about the goal of sustaining equal <i>organizational</i> relations. I show that they can do so by trying to overcome the important challenges that come with a (surprisingly neglected) key insight of the economic theory of the firm, namely that the main distinction between firms and markets is the exercise of managerial authority within hierarchical structures within the firm. Second, I try to articulate a relational “route” toward economic democracy (broadly defined as increased workers participation in economic decision-making), by claiming that it should be seen as an institutional arrangement protecting workers against managerial authoritarianism. This relational argument differs from other classical and “distributive” arguments in favor of workplace democracy. It is because it does not rely on a recharting of the Rawlsian notion of the basic structure of society, on strong (and allegedly problematic) conceptions of active citizenship, neither on the supposed side-effects of economic democratization (as argued in the Millian tradition).
<b>(32) Daniel Putnam</b>	<b><i>Equality of Intelligibility</i></b>
PhD candidate in Philosophy University of Yale	Relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler have argued that justice requires persons to treat one another with equal <i>respect</i> or <i>recognition</i> . A natural way of specifying this proposal is that justice requires persons to equally recognize one another's <i>interests</i> . Recognizing someone's interest entails treating that interest as a practical reason. Because it is impossible to treat some consideration as a practical reason if one does not understand it, it is impossible to recognize an interest that is <i>unintelligible</i> . Building on David Velleman's work, I spell out the notion of intelligibility in terms of what can be understood according to prevailing folk-psychological norms of interpretation. Building on Miranda Fricker's work, I then argue that part of what has made the treatment of women and sexual minorities unjust is that some of their most important interests--in one, the interest in being free from sexual harassment; in the other, the interest in marrying a member of the same sex--have been unrecognized, because unrecognizable, because unintelligible. From this, I infer the norm of equality of intelligibility: justice requires the social conditions in which different persons' interests are equally intelligible.
<b>(33) Rabi Prakash</b>	<b><i>Equalitarian Movements as Source and Companion to Social Equality</i></b>
PhD candidate in Sociology Jawaharlal Nehru University	In the proposed paper, I critique the well-established understanding that ‘individualism’ entails equality and ‘holism’ entails inequality; as individualism and holism are respective essences of two different kind of societies (Dumont 1967). I argue that social equality is a social ideology which emanates rather from the historical democratic and egalitarian movements which conceive the then prevailing state of society based upon their understanding of inegalitarian ideologies and injustice. By suggesting this, the paper, concludes that the nature of social inequality is ever evolving and is rather defined by egalitarian movements of the society. The paper makes references to two historical egalitarian movements in 19 <sup>th</sup> century India, respectively led by Rammohun Roy (1772-1833) and Jyotirao Phule (1827-1890) who laid the foundation for an egalitarian society in India. The paper would suggest that in order to achieve social equality, it is important to understand the historic moments of injustice and inegalitarianism in a society. Egalitarian movements are source and companion to social equality.

<b>(34) Vasti Roodt</b>	<b><i>Equality, Institutions and Stokvels: In Search of Moral Justification for Social Policy</i></b>
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy University of Stellenbosch	This paper is concerned with equality as the moral justification for social policy, with particular emphasis on South Africa. I begin by examining four arguments for equality that have gained some traction in South African public discourse: (i) the argument from efficiency; (ii) the argument from compensation; (iii) the argument from exploitation and (iv) the argument from opportunity. I show that none of these arguments is capable of accounting for equality as a moral ideal, which renders them incapable of winning support for any social policy across existing social, political and economic divides. In the second part of the paper, I then try to work out a conception of equality that would be a candidate for such consensus. I argue that equality should be understood analogous to participation in a Stokvel – a South African version of a mutual savings and investment club – in which members co-operate in a shared project according to agreed-upon terms that they can all endorse as fair.
<b>(35) Gina Schouten</b>	<b><i>Does the Gendered Division of Labor Undermine Citizenship?</i></b>
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Illinois State University	Despite women's increased labor force participation, household divisions of labor remain highly unequal. Certain "gender egalitarian" policy initiatives could bring about a more equal sharing of paid work and caring work. But such initiatives face a daunting justificatory burden within the theoretical framework of political liberalism, which imposes demanding criteria for legitimate political interventions into the life of the family. Some theorists have argued that, despite appearances to the contrary, political liberalism <i>can</i> approve gender egalitarian political interventions. One recent such argument concludes that political liberalism—and in particular that framework's commitment to the realization of <i>citizenship</i> —imposes substantive feminist requirements on the just liberal state. My project is to show that, in its current form, this argument can show only that a <i>hierarchal</i> gendered division of labor (GDL) undermines citizenship. This limitation is problematic for two reasons: First, the GDL is not <i>essentially</i> hierarchal, and morally objectionable harms would persist even if the GDL were <i>non</i> -hierarchal. Second, the policy initiatives licensed by a hierarchal diagnosis of the GDL would actually <i>exacerbate</i> the morally objectionable harms that inhere in the non-hierarchal features of the GDL. I will propose a more promising strategy for defending gender egalitarian interventions using considerations of political citizenship.
<b>(36) David Schroeren</b>	<b><i>A New Proposal for Rawlsian Duties of Justice to Future Generations</i></b>
BPhil candidate in Philosophy University of Oxford	How can justice, equality and democratic institutions be ensured across generations? Rawls' <i>Theory of Justice</i> attempted not only to provide principles of justice for the organisation of the basic structure of society, but also a proposal for the preservation of this structure for future generations. The purpose of this paper is to argue that a hypothetical choice situation similar to Rawls's original position provides an adequate basis to derive obligations of justice to future generations, and that these include an obligation to reduce existential risk, as well as an obligation to provide a fair distribution of natural resources and reproductive permissions amongst generations. Up to now, moral reasoning that correctly recognises the seriousness of existential risk, and hence the high priority it deserves in public policy, has been dominated by consequentialist approaches whereas non-consequentialist attempts have been cursory. If the argument in this paper succeeds, then deontological morality may have gained some ground on its consequentialist rivals. I begin by identifying the shortcomings of Rawls' proposal and developments thereof in the recent literature. I construct an <i>intergenerational</i> original position (IOP) comprised of suitably motivated parties, each of which represent one generation, and argue and remaining intergenerational primary goods are fairly distributed.

<b>(37) Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi</b>	<b><i>Reconfiguring Inequality through the Virtues and Values Implied by Equality</i></b>
<p>Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy Great Zimbabwe University</p> <p>Senior Lecturer in Philosophy University of Abuja</p>	<p>This paper addresses the following question: How do we achieve a compelling idea of equality such that in holding the views implied it would seem that inequality is no longer a viable urgent human imperative? To address this question, I argue that this can be achieved by looking at how we can reconfigure inequality to serve the same end as would be implied by equality. How then can this be done? I will argue that this can be done by addressing those values and principles that inequality promotes and seeking to make/infuse the virtues/“burdens” of equality on them. These values principles include: (in) difference, (unequal)power, (unequal)opportunity, (dis)advantage. The argument I shall defend is that equality is fundamentally a social equilibrium/virtue which can be infused in any virtue/social virtue and once this obtains even among virtues promoted by inequality then the ideas suggested by inequality will serve a different end. To achieve the goals of the paper I shall: (i) Articulate gains and implications of equality. Thereafter I shall (ii) Articulate the challenges of inequality. I shall then (iii) state how</p>
<b>(38) Moisés Vaca</b>	<b><i>The Problem of Historical Injustice for Rawlsian Theory</i></b>
<p>Research Fellow Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México</p>	<p>In this paper we claim that Rawls’s theory as it stands right now is compatible with the absence of rectification of extremely important historical injustices within a given society. We hold that adding a new principle to justice-as-fairness may amend this problem. There are four possible objections to our claim. First, that historical rectification is not required by justice. Second, that, even when historical rectification is a matter of justice, it is not a matter of distributive justice, so that Rawls’s theory is justified in leaving it unaddressed. Third, that dealing with historical injustice is outside of the scope of ideal theory, so that even when historical rectification is required by justice, Rawls’s theory starts with the assumption that no such historical injustice has occurred. Fourth, that while historical injustice is within the scope of Rawls’s theory, there is no need for further principles of justice to deal with it, so that the correct regulation of the principles of justice-as-fairness would ensure the rectification of all relevant historical injustices of a particular society. While we offer several arguments against the first and second objections, we address the last two at length and show that both fail.</p>
<b>(39) Jonathan Wolff</b>	<b><i>Social Equality and Relative Poverty</i></b>
<p>Professor of Philosophy Dean: Faculty of Arts and Humanities University College London</p>	<p>Although many political philosophers in recent years have argued for 'pro-poor' positions (equality, sufficiency, priority to the worst off), the discussion of poverty itself has rarely featured in accounts of distributive justice, especially in domestic contexts. Yet there are interesting connections to be made between theories of social equality and the concept of relative poverty. Relative poverty is often defined along the lines of not having access to a sufficient level of resources to enable one to take part in the normal range of activities of one's society. If social equality is to be understood as the over-coming or avoidance of particular social relations, including marginalization, alienation and exclusion, then there is a clear affinity between social equality and relative poverty. This paper explores how our understanding of social equality can be enriched by looking at earlier studies of relative poverty.</p>

<b>(40) Robin Zheng</b>	<b><i>How Philosophers Can Help: Responsibility, Social Inequality, and Causal Explanation</i></b>
PhD candidate in Philosophy University of Michigan, Ann Arbor	It is sometimes thought that problem-solving in the world is not a job for philosophers. Many hard problems appear to depend on empirical facts that philosophers are not trained to study: for example, what are the causes of social inequality? In this paper, I argue that philosophy plays an inescapable and indispensable, albeit often invisible, role in the solution of contemporary social problems. I do so by drawing on a familiar insight from feminist philosophy of science: because distinctively philosophical assumptions undergird all scientific inquiry, successful problem-solving will always depend on some measure of engagement with philosophical issues. I illustrate this using an extended example of the intertwined philosophical and social scientific research on the fundamental attribution error and causal attributions for poverty in the United States, exposing how what appear to be <i>empirical</i> disputes about causes turn out to be fundamentally political and <i>moral</i> disagreements about how it could have been prevented, which in turn depend on normative expectations about who ought to possess such powers. Thus, moral philosophers who work to reshape normative expectations also play a role in restructuring causal explanations—and hence interventions—for social inequality.